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Disney, Dewey, and the Death of  
Experience in Education 
Jay W. Roberts 
“Every philosophy is under the illusion that it 
has no illusions because it has discovered the 
illusions of its predecessors.” 
 —Reinhold Niebuhr (1938) 
 
“The only ground for anticipating failure in tak-
ing this path resides to my mind in the danger 
that experience and the experimental method 
will not be adequately conceived.” 
 —John Dewey (1938) 
Introduction 
The role of experience in progressive education has a rich and varied theoretical 
history beginning with Rousseau’s Emile, continuing through the work of  
Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, and arguably best enunciated in the pragmatic tradi-
tion of William James and John Dewey. In 1938, John Dewey published Experi-
ence and Education, one of his last, and most concise, explications of his philoso-
phy of the role of experience in the curriculum. Progressive educators since 
Dewey have used his ideas to further develop and argue for the social nature of 
learning, the role of democracy in schooling, and the design and purpose of the 
curriculum. This article will examine one particularly recent offshoot of this tra-
dition, experiential education, and the implications of its approach on notions of 
democratic schooling. Specifically, I will argue that Dewey’s construction of ex-
perience has been misunderstood within this field; hence, clarification of his 
work and the potential transformative role of experience in the curriculum is 
timely and needed.  
Generally speaking, experiential education emerged from the writings and 
work of Kurt Hahn in the 1940s and 1950s in Germany and England. Hahn’s Sa-
lem and Gordonstoun schools are consistently referenced in the foundational 
narratives of the field (Miner and Boldt, 2002). Outward Bound, a widely known 
outdoor education program, was founded by Hahn in England and continues to 
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be a cornerstone in the experiential education field both in the United States and 
internationally. Perhaps the best exemplar of the nascent field is its organizing 
body—the Association of Experiential Education (AEE), which was founded in 
the 1970s. AEE’s definition of experiential education reveals the connections be-
tween Deweyan constructions of experience and “experiential” education. “Ex-
periential education is a philosophy and methodology in which educators pur-
posefully engage with learners in direct experience and focused reflection in 
order to increase knowledge, develop skills, and clarify values” (AEE website, re-
trieved 9-10-04). There are many definitions and discussions of what defines an 
educational activity as “experiential.” The following discussion by Proudman 
seems archetypal. 
Good experiential learning combines direct experience that is meaning-
ful to the student with guided reflection and analysis. It is a challenging, 
active, student-centered process that impels students toward opportuni-
ties for taking initiative, responsibility, and decision making. . . . What-
ever the activity, it is the learning and teaching process that defines 
whether a learning experience is experiential. (Proudman, 1996, p. 241) 
This theoretical and practical strand has produced an entire industry of 
applications including ropes courses, adventure education, therapeutic wilderness 
programs, expeditionary learning schools, place-based learning initiatives, and 
service learning programs, among others. Despite significant obstacles against 
their implementation, both historically and in the modern context, experiential 
approaches remain a significant, if marginalized part of the educational land-
scape. Indeed, experiential programming and curricula have expanded signifi-
cantly in recent years—particularly among groups traditionally labeled as disad-
vantaged or “at-risk”—as educators seek novel ways to engage students who do 
not experience success in more traditional educational environments. 
The arguments on the effectiveness of such programs are well-intentioned. 
They get students out of the confinement of the four-walled classroom (Keen 
and Howard, 2002). They acknowledge and recognize individual differences and 
the importance of group learning (Rubin, 2000). They stress “real-world” appli-
cation and relevance to what is taking place in kids’ lives (Smith, 2002). Often, 
and rightly so, some of these approaches are championed as examples of innova-
tive thinking and practice in curriculum development (Lee, 1976; Sizer, 1992; 
Meier, 1995; Fried, 1995). Examples are legion of students whose lives have been 
transformed by such educative experiences. Laudable outcomes include im-
proved self-efficacy, increases in trust, accelerated relationship-building, and en-
hanced problem-solving, communication, and leadership skills. By all accounts, 
John Dewey should be quite proud of this manifestation of his philosophy. But, 
despite the lack of substantive critique of these approaches,
1
 those who care 
deeply about the democratic and transformative role of experience in the cur-
riculum ought to be uneasy. 
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I hope to achieve a delicate balance in the pages that follow. As an individ-
ual who thinks about curriculum matters and their consequences to our society, 
I would like to question and contest some of the modern manifestations of 
Dewey’s educational philosophy. As an advocate (and practitioner) of experien-
tial approaches, I also hope to further legitimize and enhance the position of 
such pedagogy in the discourse on curricular reform. This might be like attempt-
ing, as one of my old teachers once remarked, “to rebuild a ship while at sea.” 
Nevertheless, despite its obvious perils, I believe the project is worth doing, and, 
more importantly, essential for the long-term health and sustainability of pro-
gressive approaches to schooling. 
I will begin with a vignette and an operational definition of the experiential 
education approach, briefly outlining its potential as an educational construct. I 
will follow this with a discussion of the salient ideas of John Dewey related to the 
role of experience in education. This will be essential as a “litmus test” toward 
examining the kinds and types of programming that occur today in experiential 
education. While some have questioned the transformative potential of Dewey’s 
educational approach (Diggins, 1994; Noddings, 1995), I am more inclined to 
believe, with others, that Dewey’s democratic and transformational vision can 
continue to direct us today (Hewitt, 2002). I will then move to a discussion of 
the modern applications of Dewey’s philosophy and, drawing from the work of 
George Ritzer and Henry Giroux, question the degree to which some of these ex-
periential curricular approaches are democratic, transformative, or even educa-
tive at all. I will conclude with what I believe to be the potential costs of such 
curricula and advocate for a re-construction (to borrow a phrase from Dewey) of 
the philosophical and ethical approaches to experience in education. 
Experience-as-Technique 
Several years ago, my undergraduate class in education worked with a local junior 
high by student teaching for approximately one hour twice a week. The students 
came in and led “challenge education” activities—experiential activities and initia-
tives that focused on problem-solving, teamwork, and trust. The teachers at the local 
school loved the novelty of the activities and how they helped to break up their school 
day. The junior high school students seemed to respond well to the experience as a 
whole, constantly asking the teachers when the “big kids” were coming back to “lead 
more games.” Discussions with the students were attempted after the activities to 
help facilitate educative reflection, but this was hampered by the short time frame 
we spent with the kids. In the end, our students felt like they had done little more 
than “babysit” for two hours a week. The teachers at the local school, however, were 
thrilled at the results and asked if we would consider doing this long-term. 
The vignette above reveals one of the ways that experiential education is 
applied in school environments. In this conception, experiential processes or ac-
tivities are used as a technique available to the teacher (among a wide variety of 
Disney, Dewey, and the Death of Experience in Education ♦ 15 
Volume 21(2) ♦ 2005 
other techniques such as direct instruction, Socratic seminar, cooperative jig-
saws, etc.). I see at least six ways experience-as-technique is manifested in the 
curriculum. (1) “Hands-on” activities are used to break up the monotony of di-
rect instruction or to bring to life elements within the curriculum. (2) Field trips, 
possibly within the context of service or place-based learning, are used to “get 
kids out of the classroom.” (3) Experiential activities can be seen as accessing a 
type of intelligence (Gardner, 1983) or learning modality that teachers ought to 
use to reach a variety of different learning styles. (4) Learning-by-doing may be 
used to help cement certain concepts or principles (such as in a science lab or 
exhibition). (5) Alternatively, bringing personal experience into the classroom 
can be used as a “hook” to heighten student engagement in the material (Fried, 
1995). (6) Finally, experience can be honored in the classroom through the con-
scious use of narratives and stories as part of the social process of schooling 
(Connelly and Clandinin, 1988).  
What the vignette and many of these curricular approaches above have in 
common is the manner in which experience is technically applied. That is to say, 
meaningful activity is tightly bound (in both time and space), rationally con-
structed, and efficiently controlled. Experience becomes not organic, interactive, 
and continuous but rather something scripted, timed, and located. Normalized 
classroom or school activity stops, and experiential activity then begins for a 
bound and specific time frame. This purposive-rational approach becomes, then, 
a kind of “science of technique” and allows for experience to be both controllable 
and controlling. Drawing from Jürgen Habermas, the experience-as-technique 
approach can be viewed as a type of technocratic consciousness (Held, 1980). In 
this construct, control is “achieved through the application of techniques gener-
ated by science to social problems for the realization of specific goals. . . . The 
technical values of efficiency and economy tend to dominate the selection of the 
means” (Held, 1980, p. 265). Within this consciousness, then, experience be-
comes “experiential”—a technical solution designed to solve specific curricular 
problems. The “means” of experience become secondary to the dominating in-
fluences of economy, efficiency, and control. I believe this techno-rational 
framework and its manifestation through experience-as-technique represents a 
growing trend in experiential education. This shift, by association, also has 
something to teach us about threats to the democratic role of experience in edu-
cation on a broader level. 
While there is serious cause for concern with experiential approaches, 
which I will discuss at length in this piece, it should also be noted that they are 
not without merit. Research supports the educational effectiveness of novelty, 
emotion, and challenge often associated with experiential environments (Caine 
and Caine, 1994). Teaching techniques that support cooperative interaction and 
active student engagement have been championed in the popular literature on 
educational reform (Sizer, 1992; Meier, 1995; Fried, 1995). Certainly, many ef-
fective teachers understand the importance of mixing it up in the classroom and 
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providing opportunities for students to learn in a wide variety of styles and 
methods, one of which may be experiential. Educators have long relied on the 
experiential approaches mentioned above (and many others) to create enriched 
learning environments for students. 
To summarize, experiential education is particularly vulnerable to a 
techno-rational framework. Experience becomes “experiential” in its technical 
application. Activity is tightly operationalized with a primary focus on the ele-
ments of control, economy, and efficiency. Experience-as-technique is popularly 
manifested in the curriculum through such activities as ropes courses, discrete 
experiential classroom initiatives, environmental and adventure education pro-
grams, and service-learning events. The paradigm views experiential processes as 
a useful tool in the hands of the teacher, something that can be utilized in small 
chunks, isolated perhaps from the content or at least not directly connected to it. 
I will now turn to an examination of John Dewey’s philosophy of experience to 
shed light on the possible differences between Dewey’s vision and this experien-
tial approach. 
Dewey’s Pedagogy of Experience 
John Dewey has consistently been held up (and rightfully so) as the “father” of 
experiential education among practitioners and theorists in the field. It would be 
difficult to find an article or paper on the role of experience in education that 
does not cite him. In his writings on the role of experience, Dewey constructs a 
richly textured pragmatic approach that lays the moral foundation for the crea-
tion of a democratic classroom and, thus, a more democratic society. Cornel 
West, perhaps our most provocative modern American pragmatist, sees in 
Dewey’s philosophy a clear, ethical calling. “For Dewey, philosophy is a mode 
not of knowledge but of wisdom. And wisdom is conviction about values, a 
choice to do something, a preference for this rather than that form of living” 
(West, 1989, p. 86). Dewey believed that schooling was the cultural institution 
that served as the engine for creating this form of living and at the center of this 
ought to be experience.  
Thus we reach a technical definition of education: it is that reconstruc-
tion or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of ex-
perience, and which increases the ability to direct the course of subse-
quent experience. (1) The increment of meaning corresponds to the 
increased perceptions of the connections and continuities of the activi-
ties in which we are engaged. (Dewey, 1938, pp. 76–77) 
It is here that we see the key elements of an educative experience for 
Dewey. It must achieve continuity—where the past and present transact to cre-
ate the future. And the meaning of such a transaction is directly correlative to the 
connections we make in the process. This “continuous reconstruction of experi-
ence” (Dewey, 1938, p. 80) defines what is essential in the educational endeavor 
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and, as a pedagogical approach, is separate (and superior) to alternate notions of 
education—as preparation for future living, as recapitulation of the past, or as an 
unfolding toward definitive goals (Dewey, 1944).  
Yet experience and education are not equated in Dewey’s philosophy. Not 
all experiences are educative. Some may simply be non-educative; others may be 
mis-educative. “Any experience is mis-educative that has the effect of arresting 
or distorting the growth of further experience” (Dewey, 1938, p. 25). We see here 
in Dewey the importance of individual agency or autonomy
2
 as part of the edu-
cational endeavor. Individuals must be able to direct themselves (through habits 
formed by experience). But just as all experiences are not of equal worth, neither 
are all habits. To Dewey, individuals can lose their autonomy through the forma-
tion of certain habits brought on by mis-educative experiences.  
An experience may be immediately enjoyable yet promote the formation 
of a slack or careless attitude; this attitude then operates to modify the 
quality of subsequent experiences so to prevent a person from getting 
out of them what they have to give. . . . Each experience may be lively, 
vivid, and “interesting,” and yet their disconnectedness may artificially 
generate dispersive, disintegrated, centrifugal habits. The consequence of 
formation of such habits is inability to control future experiences. 
(Dewey, 1938, p. 28)  
The worrisome part of this cautionary tale is that mis-educative experi-
ences do not simply affect an individual in the present; such experiences create 
habits that affect an individual’s ability to experience a sense of agency in future 
endeavors. To Dewey, when we entertain students with “lively, vivid, and inter-
esting” experiences that are “disconnected” we run the risk of developing in 
them habits that negatively impact their ability to direct their own futures. Thus, 
it is in the connection of the individual to the democratic community that we see 
the true moral implications of mis-educative experiences. 
One of the purposes of schooling in any culture is to socialize its members. 
Yet, it is not education but what kind of education that one must consider when 
thinking about the ethical consequences of schooling. Dewey connects this ethi-
cal concern to the socialization process of schooling through the construction of 
habits. “Any education given by a group tends to socialize its members, but the 
quality and value of the socialization depends upon the habits and aims of the 
group” (Dewey, 1916, p. 83). The way we educate depends in large part on the 
habits and aims we hold as a society. Certain habits or aims might lead to a 
model of education as reproduction (education as recapitulation of the past), 
others to a model of social production (education toward a definitive goal). To 
Dewey, however, education and schooling in a democracy must strive for some-
thing else: 
The devotion of democracy to education is a familiar fact. The superfi-
cial explanation is that a government resting on popular suffrage cannot 
18 ♦ Jay W. Roberts 
E&C ♦ Education and Culture 
be successful unless those who elect and who obey their governors are 
educated. . . . But there is a deeper explanation. A democracy is more than 
a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of con-
joint, communicated experience. (Dewey, 1916, p. 87 emphasis added)  
Habits and aims must therefore not become static or universalized in the 
pragmatist philosophy that Dewey articulates. They must be reconstructed and 
reorganized through associated living and “communicated experience” (Dewey, 
1916, p. 87). What are the ethical consequences of a society trained (through 
schooling and other institutions) on mis-educative experiences and careless hab-
its? To Dewey, it is the very opposite of organic democracy—it is a universal, 
homogenous, and lifeless world.  
The more activity that is restricted to a few definite lines—as it is when 
there are rigid class lines preventing adequate interplay of experiences—
the more action tends to become routine on the part of the class at a dis-
advantage. . . . Plato defined a slave as one who accepts from another the 
purposes which control his conduct. This condition obtains even when 
there is no slavery in the legal sense. It is found wherever men are en-
gaged in activity which is socially serviceable, but whose service they do 
not understand and have no personal interest in. (Dewey, 1916, p. 85) 
This, to me, is an astonishing and provocative claim. When we restrict and 
limit activity and the possibilities of experience to those young citizens we aim to 
educate, we entertain the very real possibility of producing what amounts to a 
society of slaves, unconscious of the meaning of their service either to them-
selves, their community, or society as a whole.  
For Dewey then, educative experience is both a foundation to a democratic 
society and a catalyst for future progress. It is in the meaningful transaction be-
tween the individual and her community (through experience) that encourages 
and promotes a diversity of growth and development and creates response-
ability. “The obstacles which confront us are stimuli to variation, to novel re-
sponse, and hence are occasions for progress” (Dewey, quoted in West, 1989, p. 
88). In a world filled with political, economic, and social injustice, how will we 
seek to create the good life? For Dewey, it is a process achieved, in part, through 
the democratic potential of the school. It should be deeply troubling that the 
current political discourse on school reform appears to be attempting to achieve 
some of the same ends (equality, opportunity, liberty) through vastly different 
processes—standardization, quantification, and high-stakes accountability. It 
should be more troubling that the transformative potential of Dewey’s philoso-
phy is, as he feared, being misapplied by those who might be in the best position 
to offer meaningful alternatives to the current dominant narratives of school re-
form.  
There is no discipline in the world so severe as the discipline of experi-
ence subjected to the tests of intelligent development and direction. 
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Hence the only ground I can see for even a temporary reaction against 
the standards, aims, and methods of the newer education is the failure of 
educators who professedly adopt them to be faithful to them in practice . . . 
the greatest danger that attends its future is, I believe, the idea that it is an 
easy way to follow, so easy that its course may be improvised. (Dewey, 
1938, p. 90, emphasis added) 
Would You Like Fries with That? 
It is clear that, for Dewey, experience was seen as the center of the educational 
endeavor, not something to be technically applied. Yet, I hope to argue that 
some experiential approaches are not simply a harmless (if less-effective) step-
sibling of Dewey’s pedagogy of experience. Perhaps that is what they can be at 
their best. However, the shift from “experience” to “experiential” has a potential 
dark side, one that does not merely miss the mark of Dewey’s democratic and 
transformative aims, but actually subverts them. Importantly, this is not a con-
scious act on the part of educators and curriculum planners, but is rather the 
product of a cultural process. This process, in my mind, is exemplified in the 
work of George Ritzer (1996) and Henry Giroux (1999) in relation to two mod-
ern cultural icons: McDonald’s and the Walt Disney Company. Using both, I 
hope to show how experience has become co-opted and commodified in our 
schooling processes.  
To Ritzer, institutions and other areas of society can be co-opted through 
the icon of McDonald’s and what he calls the process of McDonaldization: 
McDonaldization can be defined as the process by which the principles 
of the fast food restaurant are coming to dominate more and more sec-
tors of American society as well as the rest of the world. McDonaldiza-
tion affects not only the restaurant business but also education, work, 
health care, travel, leisure, dieting, politics, the family and virtually every 
other aspect of society. McDonaldization has shown every sign of being 
an inexorable process by sweeping through seemingly impervious institu-
tions and parts of the world. (Ritzer, 1996, p. 198, emphasis added) 
Ritzer goes on to identity four dimensions to McDonaldization: efficiency, 
calculability, predictability, and control (1996). First, just as the fast-food indus-
try has organized itself around the minimization of time and extraneous effort 
and the maximization of productivity, so too have other sectors of society begun 
to value and adhere to the modes of efficiency. Second, Ritzer also sees society 
reifying calculability, the desire to quantify things and the tendency to rationalize 
value from quantity rather than quality. “Quantity has become equivalent to 
quality; a lot of something, or the quick delivery of it, means it must be good” 
(Ritzer, 1996, p. 199).  
Third, McDonald’s emblematizes consistency and predictability—the idea 
that the product you get from one place to another will be the same. For Ritzer, 
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this goes beyond a guarantee that the Big Mac one eats in New York will be the 
same as the Big Mac one gets in Los Angeles (or Buenos Aires, for that matter). 
Predictability also permeates into organizational structures and human resources 
through the concept of scripting. Employees are expected to follow scripts in 
their interactions with customers (Leidner, 1993) in order to ensure consistency 
with worker-customer interactions. Finally, there is an element of control. Ritzer 
emphasizes the role of technology in this dimension of McDonaldization: “. . . 
control, especially through substitution of nonhuman for human technology, is 
exerted over the people who enter the world of McDonald’s” (Ritzer, 1996, p. 
201). By controlling the amount of human influence on the product, McDon-
ald’s is able to control the quality and level of service, thus contributing to a con-
sistent product to the customer.  
Finally, Ritzer is quick to point out that a critique of McDonald’s and the 
process of McDonaldization does not necessitate a Pollyanna return to a simpler 
time. His focus is progressive—on the possible consequences of this process for 
the future. “The future in this sense is defined as human potential, unfettered by 
the constraints of McDonaldized systems. This critique holds that people have the 
potential to be far more thoughtful, skillful, creative, and well rounded than they 
are now” (Ritzer, 1996, p. 203).  
The McDonaldization of Experience 
My phone at work rings at 10:00 a.m. on a Tuesday morning. “Hello?” “Jay, hi! It’s 
Brian Waterston, the principal over at Middletown Junior High School. We’d like to 
do the ropes again this year with our seventh-grade class. Just like last year—three 
hours in the morning of the low ropes and then two hours in the afternoon on the 
high ropes. You know, the team-building, trust stuff—you guys do such a great job 
with all that. We’ll have about 70 kids this year. Have your fees gone up? Just send 
me over the contract and I’ll get it processed right away. Thanks again, Jay, the kids 
are so excited to come—they just love it every year.” 
This is a scenario that I have experienced countless times in my earlier ca-
reer as the director of an experiential education program. And it is one that is 
not limited to those of us who are involved with orchestrating ropes-course pro-
grams for youth. It plays out in myriad ways in service-learning programs, at-
risk and intervention activities, and alternative education projects. I have been 
asked by colleagues of mine to “do some team-building” for their classes (usually 
for an hour or two). I have taken part in ten-day “learning how to learn” pro-
grams that use experiential approaches with at-risk youth burned out from tradi-
tional schooling, and I have seen service-learning designed as a discrete unit in 
course curricula. I myself have mixed up my own classes with liberal sprinklings 
of initiatives, hands-on activities, and interactive games. Throughout these ex-
periences and observations, the nagging feeling that we are not living out 
Dewey’s vision consistently bothers me. And worse, I am beginning to believe 
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that these experiences are actually mis-educative. The subtle shift from experience 
to experiential and the resulting difference in educational perspectives leaves ex-
periential approaches vulnerable to issues of commodification and co-optation. 
The four domains of McDonaldization (efficiency, calculability, predictability, 
and control) can function within this approach to create educational outcomes 
potentially quite different from those originally intended.  
This is not a new worry in the examination of experience in the curricu-
lum. Theodore Wichmann (1995) points to a key “heresy” in modern experien-
tial education—the “Learning By Doing” heresy. In the Learning By Doing her-
esy, Wichmann views experiential theorists and practitioners falling into the trap 
of “blind faith, activity cookbooks, and . . . process-centered theories [that are, in 
the end] mis-educative” (Wichmann, 1995, p. 115). Wichmann also states a con-
cern for the “cultural homogeneity” embedded in experiential education and no-
tions of educational reform (1995). Dan Garvey, current president of Prescott 
College, in a speech entitled “The Future of Adventure Education” given at the 
2002 Rocky Mountain Region Conference of the Association of Experiential 
Education, discussed four areas that he believed are radically changing within the 
field of experiential education. In one area, “Learning What We Teach,” Garvey 
argued that we are experiencing a problem of “over processing” in modern ap-
plications of experiential theory. So many young people have now attended a 
number of experiential learning programs that they have become programmed 
in both what to expect and how to respond to placate the teachers. This portion 
of the speech, in my view, is so revealing, it is worth quoting at length: 
We may have to change the message we are delivering to our younger 
participants. I think we’ve got a generation of kids that has been overly 
processed. Many young people have attended a number of experiential 
activities, and they’ve learned that some instructors will accept any rea-
sonable response when the student is asked to reflect upon the experi-
ence. They know what we want them to say. I joke that many of our cur-
rent participants know there are two things they can say when they 
reflect on the power of an experience, no matter what the experience is. 
First, they say that they have learned trust. If they don’t get the appropri-
ate approval, they add the word communication. We have a generation of 
kids who will give us exactly what they think we want to hear. (Garvey, 
2002, p. 29, emphasis added) 
Both Wichmann and Garvey are correct in worrying about the ethical con-
sequences of such a delivery-based, product-oriented curriculum. However, both 
Wichmann and Garvey fall short of questioning the pedagogical foundations 
that allow such a curriculum to emerge in the first place. In their view, it is as-
sumed that experiential activities are powerful and educational and that it is 
simply a question of improperly applied technique that produces the inadequate 
result. This, to me, is a fundamental problem with the experientialist paradigm: 
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it tends to see experience through a techno-rational lens, as an isolated activity, 
or technique, to achieve specified and prescribed objectives.  
In the attempt to bring what happens “outside the classroom” into the 
curriculum, experiential approaches have changed a transformational ethic of 
“curriculum is life”–“life is curriculum” to a homogenized “curriculum of life,” 
packaged and delivered top-down from teacher to student; commodified into 
Ritzer’s four domains. The experiential approach is often based on efficiency; 
most educational experiences in this paradigm are short-term in duration and 
structured in such a way as to maximize production (hands-on time) while 
minimizing effort (just pick up the phone and schedule a ropes course). It is 
based on calculability; students have many experiences (emphasis on quantity), 
but the quality of such experiences and the degree to which they are continuous 
and connected are less clear. Predictability exists with “canned” and almost 
scripted experiences marketed and out-sourced by various companies and or-
ganizations (alternative Spring Breaks, environmental education programs, ad-
venture guides, etc.). In a sense, many of these experiences have taken the place 
of the venerable “field trip” to bring novelty to the traditional academic week. 
Finally, Ritzer’s domain of control emerges through programs that use activity at 
the expense of real learning. For Ritzer, control occurs through the substitution 
of non-human technology for human technology (Ritzer, 1996). In the experien-
tial paradigm activity can easily substitute for real human interaction. Students 
“experience” a product delivered to them. They rarely have control over its con-
struction. This is pronounced in its difference from Dewey’s definition of con-
trol. “Control, in truth, means only an emphatic form of the direction of powers, 
and covers the regulation gained by an individual through his own efforts quite 
as much as that brought about when others take the lead” (Dewey, 1916, p. 24). 
Yet experiential education is not only vulnerable to processes of co-optation as 
typified by Ritzer’s McDonaldization, it also can function as an amplifier of 
other hegemonic processes, such as commodification.  
It’s a Small World After All 
For Henry Giroux, it is Disney, as opposed to McDonald’s, that best represents 
the power of a cultural icon and its ability to shape societal values and actions.  
Questioning what Disney teaches is part of a much broader inquiry re-
garding what it is parents, children, educators, and others need to know 
in order to critique and challenge, when necessary, those institutional 
and cultural forces that have a direct impact on public life. Such inquiry 
is most important at a time when corporations hold such an inordinate 
amount of power in shaping children’s culture into a largely commercial 
endeavor, using their various cultural technologies as teaching machines 
to commodify and homogenize all aspects of everyday life—and in this 
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sense posing a potential threat to the real freedoms associated with a 
substantive democracy. (Giroux, 1999, p. 11) 
For Giroux then, questioning Disney is as much about keeping a critical 
eye on the social forces of commercialization and its effects on real lives as it is 
about deconstructing the iconic meaning of a Mouse. As our public spheres be-
come increasingly commodified, the ability of individuals acting in those spheres 
to participate in shaping the future becomes more and more limited. In a sense, 
we become an entertained populace rather than an educated one. “None of us 
stands outside of the cultures of pleasure and entertainment that now hold such 
sway over American society. The test of such cultures . . . may lie . . . in their ca-
pacity to offer narratives of pleasure without undermining the basic institutions 
of democracy” (Giroux, 1999, p. 12). As the language and operational values of 
business and entertainment culture continue to seep their way into our public 
spheres, it should be no surprise that our schools would be affected. Indeed, edu-
cational researchers have begun to focus more attention on the “mis-educative” 
effects of mass-marketing in our schools (Molnar and Reaves, 2002). In sum-
mary, the rise in corporate sponsorship and the business-like reform discourse of 
“accountability,” “consolidation,” and “achievement” all indicate the vulnerabil-
ity of schools and educational institutions to the processes of commodification 
represented iconically by Disney. This commodification can be amplified 
through various processes. It is my suspicion that experiential approaches can 
function in just this way.  
The Disneyfication of Experience 
Mitch Sakofs uses the metaphor of candy to explain how experiential activities 
can become trivialized in their application: “I was seeing powerful activities used 
indiscriminately, without thought, resulting in an unintentional outcome of 
trivializing them through overuse and/or misapplication. In effect, and in a 
metaphoric sense, making them candy-sweet and desirable, but with no sub-
stance or meaning, or robbed of substance or meaning” (Sakofs, 2001, p. 5). Sa-
kofs goes on to say that a second metaphor may help illuminate the problem—
that of antibiotics. To Sakofs, overuse or misapplication of experiential activities 
can lead to “resistance” or even immunity to the powers of the educational proc-
ess. He concludes by advising practitioners to better discern when they are being 
asked to deliver “candy” and when they are being asked to actually educate. 
While recognizing the need for people in the business of experiential program-
ming to “make a living,” he encourages practitioners to resist the temptation and 
hold themselves to a higher ethical standard as purveyors of “education” not 
“recreation” (Sakofs, 2001, p. 5). Again, similar to Wichmann and Garvey, Sa-
kofs correctly identifies a concern with the techno-rational paradigm, the Dis-
ney-like “edutainment” that can occur with experiential programming. But he 
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falls short of critically examining this “Disneyfication of experience” and its po-
tential to sanitize and trivialize transformative pedagogies. 
To summarize, the experiential construction of experience functions to 
amplify its commodification and it makes the broader pedagogy more vulnerable 
to co-optation and criticism. Gone from this construction is the Deweyan legacy 
of placing experience at the center of the educational endeavor. In its place is de-
liverable product, easily made into candy. In its place are students thoughtlessly 
regurgitating “what they think we want to hear” (Garvey, 2002, p. 5). Recently, 
the United States has experienced tremendous growth in experiential program-
ming at both the secondary and post-secondary levels (Punzon, 1999). Ropes 
courses, climbing walls, service-learning trips, expeditionary learning programs, 
environmental education units, and other approaches have become standard in 
many localities. Organizations have sprung up around the country to offer sum-
mer programs, often targeted to at-risk youth who attend as an option to jail 
time or whose parents send them as a “last resort.” Interestingly, these courses 
have become known as “hoods-in-the-woods” programs, a term that reveals 
much about the hegemony embedded within experiential education today. The 
vast majority of these experiences seem to be limited in timeframe—a few hours 
in most cases to a few days or weeks for the rare exceptions. Almost all programs 
of this type tout the importance of reflection (or the processing of the experience 
after the fact). But, in reality, and as the speech from Dan Garvey suggests, these 
reflection “sessions” are mechanical, formulaic, and often devoid of true mean-
ing. “What was that last activity about, kids?” “Trust!” “Eric, what did you learn 
from our service day today?” “That I can make a difference!” The responses spill 
forth like cheers at a pep rally—well orchestrated, but perhaps devoid of real 
feeling. We convince ourselves that our students have learned something of 
worth.  
Lest one think this type of educational approach only pertains to the world 
of outdoor education, I offer a specific example from higher education. At the 
institution where I currently teach, we have decided to require a new course for 
all first-year students entitled “Living and Learning in Community.” The idea 
behind the course is to teach essential life-skills and values to help entering stu-
dents navigate college and this major transition in their lives. Communication, 
leadership, and decision-making skills are discussed along with attempts to de-
velop relationships and community (with a small dose of service-learning 
thrown in for good measure). The faculty teaching this course often use experi-
ential techniques to illuminate the material. Yet, a first-year student, providing 
feedback on the course, remarked, “I would like it to include real life controver-
sies that happen in the dorm instead of always talking about the hypothetical.” 
How could a course, designed specifically to bring ideas of the community into 
the curriculum, still not address “real life” for this student? This response, I 
would argue, is a direct result of an experiential paradigm that sees “life-skills” 
and experience as something to be taught in isolation, moment to moment. 
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“Today we will be discussing leadership. Thursday we will do service.” It falls 
prey to the false dichotomy that real life exists outside the classroom, but what 
we do “in here” is artificial.  
The Ethics of Experience 
What are the ethical consequences of such an educational approach? Two come 
immediately to mind—one specific, the other general. My specific concern re-
lates directly to the field of experiential education and the ideal of hands-on 
learning. In the words of Katy Haycock of the Education Trust, “are we giving 
the very kids who need more, less?” Experiential education is often targeted at 
historically marginalized groups: “at-risk” students, adjudicated youth, alterna-
tive educational programs, etc. These are the students who often do not succeed 
in more mainstream educational environments. Yet, if the experiential approach 
leans more toward Disney than Dewey, we may be reproducing existing stratifi-
cation rather than ameliorating it. What is needed are orchestrated experiences 
that transform both the subject and the student. Yet, it seems more often than 
not, what needy students get is watered-down content and disconnected and su-
perfluous activity that succeeds only in getting them further behind. There is evi-
dence to support this fear. A study believed by its authors to be “the best records 
yet reported for a follow-up program for troubled youth” who participated in a 
short-term adventure therapy program indicated that the youth in question 
seemed to end up in a worse situation emotionally and educationally than prior 
to enrolling in the program (Durgin and McEwen, 1993, p. 325). Additionally, 
research suggests significant variability in program quality and instructor qualifi-
cations for such programs (Matthews, 1993; Rosol, 2000). Finally, the effective-
ness of hands-on methods in the classroom has been questioned. 
The research suggests that such methods are uncertain, unfair (not all 
children learn from them), and inefficient, and therefore should be used 
sparingly. Caution is especially required when the phrase “hands-on” is 
used to imply disdainfully that visual and verbal learning is artificial and 
unengaging. Antiverbal prejudices spell disaster for disadvantaged stu-
dents, who have not been exposed to the breadth of verbal learning out-
side the school. (Hirsch, 1996, p. 253) 
While some in the field have begun to articulate a social justice approach 
to experiential education—going so far as to claim it as an “emancipatory prac-
tice” (Warren and Loeffler, 2000, p. 87)—sustained efforts in this regard are cur-
rently lacking. Better research into the impacts (both negative and positive) of 
experiential approaches is needed. Deliberation on the theoretical and practical 
meanings of experience in education in addition to louder self-criticism from 
within the field can also help guard against the co-optation of experience.  
My general concern relates to the kind of citizen we produce under the ex-
periential paradigm. If we are to concede that commercialization has a growing 
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presence in our schools, there is a clear and present danger to our democracy. 
Our sense of unity and solidarity becomes based upon consumption rather than 
creation and participation (Molnar and Reaves, 2002). And for Dewey, 
it may be a loss rather than a gain to escape from the control of another 
person only to find one’s conduct dictated by immediate whim and ca-
price, that is, at the mercy of impulses into whose formation intelligent 
judgment has not entered. A person whose conduct is controlled in this 
way has at most the illusion of freedom. Actually he is directed by forces 
over which he has no command. (Dewey, 1938, pp. 64–65) 
Thus, in a general sense, the experiential paradigm becomes part of a larger 
problem, rather than a potentially powerful and transformational curriculum re-
sponse. Pre-packaged and sweet (like candy), efficiently and predictably man-
aged (like McDonald’s), and slickly produced (like Disney), it can give us only 
the illusion of freedom. If our nation is to address real concerns of inequality, 
marginalization, hegemony, and injustice, we must learn a new sense of civics—
one that is based upon the ideals of participation, deliberation, community, and 
responsibility. And we can best achieve these ideals through our public schools. 
But only if we practice. Experiential education, as currently constructed, does not 
allow for enough of this level of “deep play.”  
Conclusion 
So, what is the alternative to the experiential approach? Or, more fairly, what is 
the deeper pedagogy we ought to be advocating? I would argue for a return to 
the Deweyan notion of placing experience at the center of the educational en-
deavor. Rather than seeing it as the application of technique, we ought to be ex-
ploring the richness and complexity of experience in the curriculum in both the-
ory and practice. This may not please educators looking for the “right” 
experiential curriculum. I would argue that the project is not about foundational 
guidelines or technical models but rather a dynamic, relational reconstruction. 
This, I believe, holds true to Dewey’s pragmatic roots—that curricular solutions 
ought to emerge from localized, empirical considerations.  
This stress follows from pragmatism’s shift away from first principles, 
self-evident truths, and epistemic foundations to effects, fruits, conse-
quences. The contingency of self, community, and world as well as the 
revisability of theories, knowledges, and moralities leads Dewey to quip, 
“What should experience be but a future implicated in a present!” In this 
sense, experience is experimental. (West, 1989, p. 90) 
To play off of the notion of the “revisability of theory,” what does it mean 
to place experience at the center of the educational endeavor? That question, 
rather than the more ubiquitous “what activities can I do?” ought to be our mis-
sion. When considering the first question, synergies with many recent works 
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come to mind. Parker Palmer’s construct of the role of the teacher (1998), Gail 
McCutcheon’s idea of solo and group deliberation (2002), David Orr’s distinc-
tions between “slow” and “fast” knowledge (2002), and work from the brain-
based learning field (Caine and Caine, 1994; Roberts, 2002) all speak to the theo-
retical idea of experience at the center of the curriculum. Such an open, theoreti-
cal approach can even reveal individuals that have never been considered as part 
of the experiential paradigm (Dorothy Lee’s incredible collection of essays, Valu-
ing the Self, comes immediately to mind here). In terms of practice, the agenda 
for those who care about the transformational role of experience in the curricu-
lum includes reflecting on the local successes and failures of our experiential 
practices while resisting the desire for a universal experiential approach. While 
models exist such as Deborah Meier’s community work in New York and Bos-
ton, Ted Sizer’s Coalition of Essential Schools (1997), and James Beane’s (1997) 
work with curriculum integration, caution must be exercised in normalizing 
these approaches. Meier herself speaks to the value of difference: 
If all schools are not required to follow the same fads, maybe they will 
learn something from their separate experiments. And that will nurture 
the two indispensable traits of a democratic society: a high degree of tol-
erance for others, indeed genuine empathy for them, as well as a high 
degree of tolerance for uncertainty, ambiguity, and puzzlement, indeed 
enjoyment of them. (Meier, 1995, p. 30) 
Education is messy. I do not believe that a unified, operational definition 
of “good” experiential education is possible, or even desirable. The critiques I 
have developed here are intended to encourage deliberation and careful consid-
eration of the variety of forms of experience in education and their potential 
ethical consequences. My suggested agenda here is to continue to think it out 
and practice it out—admittedly, not a ready-made, easy solution or fix. But 
Dewey did not believe this new education to be easy. “I admit gladly that the new 
education is simpler in principle than the old. . . . But the easy and the simple are 
not identical. To discover what is really simple and to act upon the discovery is 
an exceedingly difficult task” (Dewey, 1938, p. 30). Placing experience at the cen-
ter of the curriculum is not easy, and it is no surprise that we haven’t quite got it 
“right” yet. But may we forever keep trying. 
Notes 
1. A notable exception would be E. D. Hirsch and his critique of “hands-on learn-
ing” and “learning by doing” in The Schools We Need and Why Don’t Have Them. 
2. It is important to note here that Dewey’s definition of autonomy is bound in so-
cial interaction and should not be confused with more modernistic, Kantian construc-
tions of the atomized and rational individual. In this sense, Dewey was interested in a per-
son’s ability to act on circumstances and events rather than to control them. 
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